News from around the World

News Archive

March 2010

FIREINF - the essential tool to keep you up-to-date with the latest fire information from worldwide sources

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FABIG Technical Meeting covering 'Ignition' on the 28 and 29 of April 2010 in Aberdeen, London and via webcast

The meeting will cover "Ignition" and will be a half day event held on Wednesday, 28th of April 2010 in Aberdeen and on Thursday the 29th in London and via live webcast (registering for the webcast also enables subsequent access to a video recording of the event for 2 weeks).

The programme for the event includes:

• Ten Things you should know about Electrostatic Ignition Hazards
  Barry Cunliffe - Chilworth Technology
• Mechanical Equipment Ignition Risk Assessments - The Basics
  Barry Cunliffe - Chilworth Technology
• Critical Conditions for Auto-ignition in Large Vessels
  Timothy Snee - Health & Safety Laboratory
• Ignition Modelling in Risk Analysis
  Jan K. Lund - Scandpower
• Problems in the Consistent Use of Ignition Models in QRA
  Brian Bain and Philip Nalpanis - DNV

The final programme comprising the detailed schedule will be provided shortly on the FABIG website. It is expected that the presentations will take place between 13.45 and 17.15 (registration and lunch will start at 12.45).

Members of most engineering institutions can count FABIG Technical Meetings as Continuing Professional Development (CPD). Attendance certificates are issued to delegates upon request.

You can find more information and register for the event online at the FABIG website at www.fabig.com/events. Attendance is free of charge for FABIG members and £350 + VAT per person for non members. For non members, the fee to attend the live webcast is £200 + VAT per person.

For more information regarding registration, please contact Lis Oliver by email at fabig@steel-sci.com or by phone at +44 (0) 1344 636 537

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EEMUA Publication 207 "Double Concrete Tanks for Liquefied Gas: Guide to design, construction and operation"

This pioneering Guide is a world first in defining good and best practices for engineering such tanks - storage facilities that will be not only safety critical, but also could be critical to safeguarding a part of the national infrastructure for many countries around the globe.

A wealth of technical information is included in EEMUA 207 - technical content supported by years of experience gained by the authors in building and operating similar structures. The authoring group comprised representatives from EEMUA member companies, such as BP, ExxonMobil and Shell, together with representatives from engineering construction and inspection organisations, such as AF CryoTank, Arup, Lloyd's Register, Technip and Whessoe Oil and Gas. Following the Guide should therefore reduce the risk of mistakes and poor practice during design, construction and commissioning.

The Publication should resolve many of the technical issues encountered during double concrete tank projects, thus reducing the need for 'technical debate' and improving project timescales, costs and quality.

"For an owner who has elected to adopt the double concrete concept, EEMUA 207 will be invaluable," says Dr Derek Hill of Foster Wheeler Energy Limited, a member of the authoring group. "The cost of producing a specification for a tank from scratch is reduced to simply reviewing EEMUA 207 and possibly adding their own preferences."

Similarly, EEMUA 207 provides for the engineering contractor detailed information that will minimise the risk of obtaining varying quotations from tank constructors.

Tank designers will also benefit for the EEMUA Guide: it gives them a clear basis for their calculations. And tank construction companies are informed of the quality of testing and examination required for materials, construction methods and the tank structure.

EEMUA Publication 207 "Double Concrete Tanks for Liquefied Gas: Guide to design, construction and operation" is available online at www.eemua.org/shop.aspx or by telephoning EEMUA Sales on +44 (0) 20 76 21 00 11.

US NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards

The US National Institute for Occupation Safety and Health (NIOSH) Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards (NPG) is intended as a source of general industrial hygiene information on several hundred chemicals/classes for workers, employers, and occupational health professionals.

The NPG does not contain an analysis of all pertinent data, rather it presents key information and data in abbreviated or tabular form for chemicals or substance groupings (e.g. cyanides, fluorides, manganese compounds) that are found in the work environment. The information found in the NPG should help users recognize and control occupational chemical hazards.

NIOSH Publication Number 2005-149: www.cdc.gov/niosh/npg

Societal Risk and the consideration of technical and policy issues

A public consultation exercise on broad proposals for the use of Societal Risk to address risks from Major Hazards around Top Tier COMAH sites (CD 212) was undertaken in 2007. Arising from the consultation, and other contributions, a list of 23 areas of technical and policy matters was compiled for further consideration. In order to address these matters HSE formed a special "task and finish" Technical Advisory Group (TAG) to advise, challenge and support the development of societal risk methodology, criteria and delivery mechanism suitable for use in land use planning. These issues were developed within HSE and during TAG meetings in 2008 and 2009 as part of the Societal Risk (SR) Land Use Planning (LUP) project.

This is a summary of HSE's consideration of these issues and how they will be taken into societal risk assessment.HSE are developing a model for the estimation of societal risk from major accident hazard installations. The results may be used to advise local authorities on proposed land use allocations around certain major hazard installations, and to complement PADHI (Planning Advice for Developments near Hazardous Installations) advice.

As a result of the discussions and advice from the TAG, HSE has developed an 'Adopted Position' for these issues for the purpose of moving forward with this project, one output of which will be a revision of the 1989 document 'Risk Criteria for land use planning in the vicinity of major hazards.' These adopted positions are not yet HSE Policy. The summary, is a distillation of the discussions and are not intended to be a complete summary of every aspect discussed, but to highlight some of the more important considerations. Where relevant, reference to supporting work is included.

'Prevention and control' involves the assessment of risks by the operator of the major hazard site and the implementation of appropriate safety measures. These requirements are enforced via the HSW Act and other relevant legislation, including COMAH and PSR. Prevention and control by the operator reduce the risk of a major accident to a very low level, but do not completely eliminate the possibility that one could take place. There is therefore a 'residual risk' of an accident happening.

www.hse.gov.uk/societalrisk/technical-policy-issues.pdf

International Risk Governance Council Report on Risk Governance Deficits: An analysis and illustration of the most common deficits in risk governance

Whilst this report does not relate to industrial process, it is a comprehensive study of risk management for major incidents in general. Specifically, the potential hazards and tripfalls within a risk assessment process are examined, falling into two broad categories: failure to understand the risk, and failure to respond appropriately to the risk. The aim of this report is to improve the principles used to handle situations in which there is no established standard of good practice. Quoted below from the report are the ten major problems of understanding risk and thirteen problems in responding to risk. Each of these are given consideration in relation to historic examples from fields as diverse as ecology to economics.

• (A1) the failure to detect early warnings of risk because of erroneous signals, misinterpretation of information or simply not enough information being gathered;
• (A2) the lack of adequate factual knowledge for robust risk assessment because of existing gaps in scientific knowledge or failure to either source existing information or appreciate its associated uncertainty
• (A3) the omission of knowledge related to stakeholder risk perceptions and concerns.
• (A4) the failure to consult the relevant stakeholders, as their involvement can improve the information input and the legitimacy of the risk assessment process (provided that interests and bias are carefully managed);
• (A5) the failure to properly evaluate a risk as being acceptable or unacceptable to society;
• (A6) the misrepresentation of information about risk, whereby biased, selective or incomplete knowledge is used during, or communicated after, risk assessment, either intentionally or unintentionally.
• (A7) a failure to understand how the components of a complex system interact or how the system behaves as a whole, thus a failure to assess the multiple dimensions of a risk and its potential consequences;
• (A8) a failure to recognise fast or fundamental changes to a system, which can cause new risks to emerge or old ones to change;
• (A9) the inappropriate use of formal models as a way to create and understand knowledge about complex systems (over- and under-reliance on models can be equally problematic).
• (A10) is the acknowledgement that understanding and assessing risks is not a neat, controllable process that can be successfully completed by following a checklist. Rather, this deficit is about assessing potential surprises.
• (B1) a failure to respond adequately to early warnings of risk, which could mean either under or over-reacting to warnings;
• (B2) a failure to design effective risk management strategies. Such failure may result from objectives, tools or implementation plans being ill-defined or absent;
• (B3) a failure to consider all reasonable, available options before deciding how to proceed;
• (B4) not conducting appropriate analyses to assess the costs and benefits (efficiency) of various options and how these are distributed (equity);
• (B5) a failure to implement risk management strategies or policies and to enforce them;
• (B6) a failure to anticipate the consequences, particularly negative side effects, of a risk management decision, and to adequately monitor and react to the outcomes;
• (B7) an inability to reconcile the time-frame of the risk issue (which may have far-off consequences and require a long-term perspective) with decision-making pressures and incentives (which may prioritise visible, short-term results or cost reductions);
• (B8) a failure to adequately balance transparency and confidentiality during the decision-making process, which can have implications for stakeholder trust or for security.
• (B9) a lack of adequate organisational capacity (assets, skills and capabilities) and/or of a suitable culture (one that recognises the value of risk management) for ensuring managerial effectiveness when dealing with risks;
• (B10) a failure of the multiple departments or organisations responsible for a risk's management to act individually but cohesively, or of one entity to deal with several risks.
• (B11) a failure to deal with the complex nature of commons problems, resulting in inappropriate or inadequate decisions to mitigate commons-related risks (e.g. risks to the atmosphere or oceans);
• (B12) a failure to resolve conflicts where different pathways to resolution may be required in consideration of the nature of the conflict and of different stakeholder interests and values;
• (B13) insufficient flexibility or capacity to respond adequately to unexpected events because of bad planning, inflexible mindsets and response structures, or an inability to think creatively and innovate when necessary.

International Risk Governance Council, 2009, 92 pages
ISBN 9782970063193
www.irgc.org/IMG/pdf/IRGC_rgd_web_final.pdf

RR782 - Fire and explosion properties of nanopowders

UK Health and Safety Executive, 2010, Research Report RR782, 68 pages

Nanotechnology is a rapidly expanding technology in which existing and novel materials are engineered at the nanoscale, typically in the range of 1 to 100 nanometres. Engineered nanomaterials include uniquely manufactured products with unique shapes and enhanced physical and chemical properties, compared with conventional materials of the same composition. There is currently little available information on the explosion risks of these materials. The UK Health and Safety Executive therefore commissioned this project to investigate the potential fire and explosion hazards associated with nanopowders. Test equipment and procedures were developed to assess the key properties of a selected number of nanopowders. A specialised 2 litre test vessel was developed to determine the explosion characteristics and modified standard test apparatus was used to measure the minimum ignition energy of nanopowders. Resistivity and electrostatic charging characteristics were assessed using specially designed test apparatus. Key information including K_St, P_max and MIE values were obtained for a range of metal and carbon nanopowders. Generally, the explosibility (maximum explosion pressure, rates of pressure rise and equivalent K_St) of nanopowders were found to be broadly similar to conventional micron-scale powders. However, the minimum ignition energies of some nanopowders were found to be lower than the equivalent material at micron-scale. It was demonstrated that with increasing relative humidity the resistivity of most nanopowders decreases. There was also a tendency for nanopowders to have higher resistivity values than conventional micron-scale powders. All the powders produced electrostatic charge. Generally, the charge developed by nanopowders was comparable with the micron-scale powders.

www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/rr782.pdf

Chemical warehousing: the storage of packaged dangerous goods

UK Health and Safety Executive, 2009, HSG71, 4th edition, 69 pages, ISBN 9780717662371

This fourth edition of Chemical warehousing is aimed at anyone who has responsibility for the storage of dangerous substances, regardless of the size of storage facility. It sets out control measures aimed at eliminating or reducing risks to people - at work or otherwise - from the storage of packaged dangerous goods. It reflects good practice for the design of new storage facilities (and where reasonably practicable, to existing sites) and applies to transit or distribution warehouses, open-air storage compounds, and facilities associated with a chemical production site or end user.

The guidance has been updated in light of changes to legislation and new sections have been added, to reflect changes to industry practice and what chemicals warehouses store, covering: aerosols; intermediate bulk containers (IBCs); storage of hazardous wastes; information, instruction and training; audit and review; and process safety performance indicator.

This guidance is specific to the storage of packaged dangerous substances. However, there are other legal health and safety requirements that you should meet, including: the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (as amended); the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974; and the Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992 (as amended); so it should be used in conjunction with other material published by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the environment agencies, including Managing contractors: A guide for employers HSG159, Storage & handling of drums & intermediate bulk containers PPG26, Getting Your Site Right: Industrial and Commercial Pollution Prevention, and Warehousing and storage: A guide to health and safety HSG76. If your chemical warehouse site falls under the requirements of the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 (as amended) (COMAH), you may need to provide supplementary measures to control the risks that are listed within this publication to achieve a level of risk that is as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). For further guidance on the COMAH Regulations, refer to A guide to the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 (as amended) L111. Where warehouses are storing large inventories of dangerous substances, e.g. flammable liquids, it may be necessary to read this book in conjunction with other guidance such as The storage of flammable liquids in containers HSG51.

www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/priced/hsg71.pdf

Chemical Accidents (Seveso II) - Review of the Directive

A review of the Seveso II Directive 96/82/EC, the provisions of which have remained essentially unchanged since its adoption, is currently ongoing.

GHS

The Directive will have to be amended due to changes to the EU system of classification of dangerous substances to which the Directive refers. The CLP Regulation (EC No. 1272/2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures (GHS), published on 31 December 2008, will repeal directives 67/548/EEC (DSD) and 1999/45/EC (DPD) by 1 June 2015.

In 2008, a Technical Working Group "Seveso and GHS3 was established. Experts from Member States and stakeholders are assessing the translation of the Seveso categories in annex I Part 2 of the Directive to the new classification system. A draft interim report, status May 2009, is available http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/pdf/twg_report.pdf.

The technical work will be accompanied by an impact assessment study of the options for adapting the Directive to the GHS, carried out by the Commission's consultants COWI. The technical work and the study will be finalised in 2009.

Studies

To inform that review process the Commission has had several studies conducted to assess the level and quality of practical implementation of the Directive.

As a first step in this exercise, a study ('Study of the Effectiveness of the Seveso II Directive') was completed in 2008. The study focuses on:

• the adequacy of the requirements imposed by the Directive to the operators of Seveso II Establishments and the objectives to prevent major accident and mitigate their consequences;
• the real impact of the requirements and the most effective way to measure it;
• the effectiveness of the implementation, in terms of compliance in the various Member States and industrial sectors, and the assessment of possible market distortion.

The main purpose of this study was to provide the Commission with key findings and lessons learnt from the implementation of the main requirements imposed on operators, focussing in particular on those relating to major accident prevention policy, safety reports and internal emergency plans.

The study was run by the European Virtual Institute for Integrated Risk Management, together with LEIA Foundation, INERIS and R-TECH, and was based on a web-based questionnaire(s) and follow-up interviews.

• Final report of the study: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/pdf/seveso_report.pdf
• Annex 1A: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/pdf/seveso_report_annex1a.pdf
• Annex 1B: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/pdf/seveso_report_annex1b.pdf

Last year a second study was launched examining the effectiveness of the main requirements imposed on public authorities. The study was run by Environmental Resources Management (ERM) and was based on a web-based questionnaire and follow-up interviews. Report of the study: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/pdf/report.zip [zipped file].

Stakeholder consultation meeting

A stakeholder consultation meeting to give interested consumer, environmental and industry organisations an opportunity to learn more about the review process and to give their views was held in Brussels on Tuesday, 10th November 2009. The meeting was attended by around 60 people, representing companies, industry and environmental NGOs. A short report of the meeting, together with copies of the presentations made during the discussions, can be accessed http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/pdf/stakeholder%20meeting%20documents.zip [zipped file]. Stakeholders were invited to submit their comments in writing by 10 December. All views will be taken into account as the review process moves forward and the Commission drafts its proposals in 2010.